Introduction
Until relatively recently, contacts between economics and evolutionary biology were quick to be deemed controversial, as when Chicago school economists explored the lessons of sociobiology for human economic behavior in the 1970s. The atmosphere has considerably cooled off since then, but there are still bouts of name-calling when an economist choose to rely on biological evolution to develop theoretical constructs in her own discipline (for a recent example, see the symposium on Gregory Clark's A Farewell to Alms [2007] 
in the August 2008 issue of the European Review of Economic History).
~ 3 ~ More substantially, there is also an unsettled debate over the heuristic value of models derived from evolutionary biology to represent economic change -the domain of study of evolutionary economics. A recent exchange between evolutionary economists is typical of the apparent dead-end reached between the skeptics and promoters of biologyinspired theories in this subfield of economics. Richard Nelson, although one of the founding fathers of evolutionary economics, judged that one should preferably not take theories developed in evolutionary biology as one's starting point, and then try to make empirical phenomena in economics fit their constraints. It would be a -much sounder and more promising position … to pay close attention to the empirical phenomena one is theorizing about, and the actual processes that seem to be at work, and develop one's theory around one's understanding of these …‖ (Nelson 2007) . To which his opponents in this debate, economist Geoffrey Hodgson and management theorist Thorbjørn Knudsen, replied that -it is a much sounder and more promising position to develop testable hypotheses from a theory that adequately captures the stylized features of the processes we wish to understand.‖ (Hodgson and Knudsen 2007) . We contend that this frontal divergence of views is typical and seems unlikely to be solved through analytical arguments. What makes for such a persistent soul searching about the role of evolutionary biology in economics, and can it be further understood by probing the nature of the interdisciplinary relationship between economics and biology? 1 Exchanges between economics and biology have been investigated from a variety of angles. In connection with the linguistic turn in philosophy of science, several nomenclatures of biological analogies and metaphors have been imagined, and their relative merits have been assessed by methodologists of economics (Khalil 1998;  ~ 4 ~ Klamer and Leonard 1994; Morgan 1995; Vromen 1995; Cohen 1993; Hodgson 2002) .
At stake is the precise characterization of the biological analogies under discussion.
-Evolutionary‖ thinking encompasses both ontogenic and phylogenic evolution, and within the class of models of phylogenic evolution one can pick among Lamarckian, Weismanian and / or Darwinian processes, to start with (Hodgson 1993; Hodgson and Knudsen 2006) . Naturally, practitioners of evolutionary economics are also active in the discussion, instantiating their claims by elaborating models and narratives and by debating on which approach seemed to capture best economic change (Witt 2005 ). Yet, these different perspectives do not address directly the question of why there is so little agreement on the heuristic value of biology for evolutionary thinking in economics.
In order to achieve a better understanding of how evolutionary theories imported from biology to economics come to be embraced or doubted about, we suggest that a look back at a particular critical discussion of evolutionary thinking in economics will be fruitful.
The contextualized examination of the most articulate criticism of biological evolutionism in economics, formulated in the middle of the twentieth century by Edith Penrose (1914 Penrose ( -1996 , provides a convenient ground to ponder what can motivate a skeptical stance towards interdisciplinary contacts, and what sort of arguments are at play. Here, the historical and contextualized method of investigation -instead of say, the analytical approach that has been favored so far -yields practical and substantial benefits.
From a practical point of view, the historical distance between the topic studied here and our contemporary concerns plays the role of a protective buffer, which permits to explore questions about the interplay between the social and scientific that would surely not be as accessible were we to ask contemporary economists and biologists. Philosophical studies discussing Penrose's article most often take Alchian's article as their departure point, and present her criticism of biological analogies as a sparring partner for Alchian' argument (Lagueux 1993; Vromen 1995) . Another thread of literature struggles to find a methodological coherence between Penrose's critical stance toward biological analogies and her theory of the growth of the firm, many finding ironical that -her own work is very much consistent with evolutionary economics‖. Penrose 1959a , 7-8 with Marshall 1920 . The contemporary appeals of using biological analogies to develop a theory of organic (endogenous) growth is also clear from the writings of American economist Allyn Young, who wrote a theoretical exposition of the growth of businesses in an explicitly analogical fashion, and on which Penrose relied to further her own theoretical arguments (Young 1928; Young 1999; Edith T. Penrose 1959a, 71) . 6 It makes it all the more meaningful and curious that Penrose devoted a full piece of her writing targeting biological analogies in particular. (Hodgson 2004a, 191) .
It would then seem that Penrose's intellectual evolution paralleled in certain ways the evolution of the relationships between social science and biology in the post-war period:
from a staunch opposition to a much more conciliatory attitude. It might then pay to have a closer look at the broader intellectual climate in which Penrose wrote her contributions, in order to provide a more detailed explanation to the -decomposition and growth‖ of biological thinking in economics (Hodgson 2005 ). We do not pretend that Penrose's stance vis-à-vis biological analogies was dictated by the political and social circumstance she lived in, and in any case we lack any direct evidence pointing in this direction. Nor do we suppose that this micro-history should play the role of a rigid template explaining other instances of affection or disaffection for biological analogies. More modestly, we will make the case that the story of Penrose shows how the social, political and scientific levels were densely interrelated in her life at the time when she wrote her criticism of biological analogies in economics, suggesting that such dimensions might also play a role in today's good and bad fortunes of interdisciplinary contacts between biology, economics and social sciences in general.
A brief survey of Penrose's 1952 article and its received view will establish that a central argument of her paper, namely that biological analogies project a conservative bias, has ~ 8 ~ been consistently ignored. Next, we will discuss how this argument built on the concept of -social Darwinism‖ of contemporary fame, substantiating our claim that many different layers -social, scientific and political -were standing in the background of her rejection of biological analogies. We will then examine elements of Penrose's biography to understand why conservatism was a matter of special concern for her at that time. In conclusion, we will reflect on the possibility to pin down a clear link between the intellectual climate of an epoch and contemporary developments in theorizing. Finally, a coda presents a last significant insight on how intertwined personal, political and professional matters were for the Penroses at the time.
~ 9 ~
Penrose on analogies
Penrose's 1952 paper is original in several respects. Published in the flagship journal of the American Economic Association, it presents itself as -not so much concerned to present an analytical critique of the theory‖ than a discussion of methodological issues related to the value of analogical reasoning in economics (Edith T. Penrose 1952, 811) . In a period when the neoclassic orthodoxy was strengthening in economics and allowing for a diminishing measure of pluralism, major journals still accepted papers on methodological issues from time to time, as in the case of the debate over mathematic formalism in economics (Morgan and Rutherford 1998) . Nevertheless, the discussion of analogies in science remained an oddity. Reflections about the linguistic and rhetoric dimension of the scientific discourse would only flourish ten years later with the publication of philosopher Max Black's Models and Metaphors, and later still in economics (Black 1962; McCloskey 1983) . Hence, Penrose's analysis of the two functions of analogies had some pretense of originality. She distinguished between a first function of analogical reasoning, which consists in comparing a well known series of events to the events in need of explanation. For such an analogy to carry explanatory value, -there must be some reason for believing that the two series of events have enough in common for the explanation of one, mutatis mutandis, to provide at least a partial explanation of the other‖ (Edith T. Penrose 1952, 807) . This, Penrose would argue, was not the case for biological analogies in the theory of the firm. Analogies between biological organisms and social entities tend to leave out of the picture the fact that intentionality plays a determinant role in the social realm. Conscious motives, such as the striving for profits by entrepreneurs, are a cardinal factor of explanation in any theory of ~ 10 ~ the firm, and should not be left out of the analysis simply because a biological analogy would not make room for it. Rather, argued Penrose, this is a sign that the biological analogy should be discarded. This argument is upheld by philosopher Maurice Lagueux, who concludes that without an analysis of intentionality, social sciences would surrender their raison d'être to the natural sciences (Lagueux 1998, 179-180) .
A second function of analogies is at work when -resemblances between two phenomena are used to add a picturesque note to an otherwise dull analysis and to help the reader to see more clearly the outlines of a process being described‖. Penrose acknowledged that this kind of analogies is indeed -indispensable to human thought,‖ (both quotes from Edith T. Penrose 1952, 807) but denied that biological analogies as deployed by Armen
Alchian and Kenneth Boulding were of this innocuous sort. In Alchian's economics natural selection just like in Boulding's ecological interpretation of social forms, it would appear that the analogy provides indeed a necessary scaffold, or even the foundations, for their conclusions.
7
The interesting issue of the epistemological validity of analogies should not let us forget a related issue discussed by Penrose, namely the conservative dimension of biological analogies in social science.
The meaning of Social Darwinism in 1952
In her article, Penrose pointed repeatedly to undesirable consequences of using biological analogies:
To abandon their [firm's] development to the laws of nature diverts attention from the importance of human decisions and motives, and from problems of ethics and ~ 11 ~ public policy, and surrounds the whole question of the growth of the firm with an aura of -naturalness‖ and even inevitability. (Edith T. Penrose 1952, 809) .
The role of biological analogies in social thought has been widely discussed by historians in connection with the historiography of social Darwinism (Hofstadter [1944 (Hofstadter [ ] 1992 Bannister 1979; Bellomy 1984; Degler 1991; Hodgson 2004b; Leonard 2009 Since her personal philosophical beliefs as well as analytical principles were at stake in Penrose's rejection of biological analogies, does it entail that this rejection was illfounded? We rather think that this situation calls for an examination of the philosophical beliefs in question. In this way, we will achieve a precise understanding of how analytical and philosophical motives converged to make biological analogies a quasi taboo in social science in the middle of the twentieth century.
10
The values of Edith Penrose
Edith Elura Tilton was born on 15 November 1914 in Los Angeles. 11 She grew up in a -close and supportive family.‖ Her father was a road engineer and the family followed him as he traveled for his surveys of the road network of California, before eventually settling in at San Luis Obispo. Her mother had an independent, affirmative personality, traits that would later also be typical of Edith's character. Edith entered the University of California at Berkeley and according to an interview she gave in the early 90s, she first experimented with -jurisprudence, philosophy, history, [and] psychology but eventually choose economics because this was the period of the great depression and the economy was in severe trouble. So I chose economics as the most interesting and relevant subject‖ (Parkin and King 1992, 187 Figure 2) . Beyond an ability to defend her arguments and knowledge of rhetorical artifices, it testified to an appetite to voice her opinion on matters of public interest. The costs for the defense of Lattimore, even with a law firm accepting to serve for free,
were to run very high, with a procedure which eventually lasted more than five years 
Conclusion and coda
The professional experience of Edith Penrose at the International Labour Office as well as the web of her familial, personal and professional connections to personalities Deal welfare state should be considered a potential disturbance and nuisance to this natural economy. Under this light, biological analogies in economics were inherently suspect of supporting the -status quo‖, for this motive they should be fought against (Penrose 1952, 809) . This essay argued that this stance might have reflected intimate personal values, but one should also note that it fitted a widely shared worldview at the time. As cultural historian Carl Degler has remarked, the reformist spirit since the Thirties was all infused with a -wish to establish a social order in which innate and immutable forces of biology played no role in accounting for the behavior of social In the past few years, interdisciplinary contacts between economics and biology have diversified: analogical reasoning has been complemented by the proposal of -generalization‖ as a mode of unification between the two disciplines (Aldrich et al. 2008) , and also by the increasing development of joint team work by biologists and economists in neuroeconomics (e.g., Pine et al. 2009; Krajbich et al. 2009 ). At face value, these new forms of interdisciplinary science should prove more impenetrable to extrinsic influence -because of the ambitions of a strict logical construct represented by -universal Darwinism‖, or thanks to the straightjacket of an experimental program -both meant to display a rigor which analogies lacked. Alternatively, these methodological developments can also be considered as new channels through which values will not be annihilated, but will flow along different, unchartered paths. In which case, and in relation with the social and political climate of our times, we should expect more, not Our focus here will be on the theoretical relationships between economics and biology, without considering the interdisciplinary relationships based on shared empirical and experimental work (as in the case of neuroeconomics). Another problematic aspect of interdisciplinary relationships between economics and biology is the imperialist attitude which these two disciplines oppose to each other. On the (lack of) validity of imperialist claims by biologists over social sciences, see Suplizio (2006) and Jackson (2010) ; see Dupre (1994) on both economics and evolutionary biology imperialisms.
2 This is not because today's scientists would have nothing to say about the broader context of the formation of their theories. Rather, they tend to perceive the discussion of this context as threatening their claims to objectivity (Latour and Woolgar 1986 [1979] ). 12 Penrose' reflections on her experience as an economist and social worker can be found in Edith Penrose (1947) .
13 Penrose and Pitelis (1999, 4 FBI file). The FBI was able to obtain a partial list of the contributors to the fund through an informant working in the bank where the donators's checks were deposited. Each of the contributors was then systematically investigated by the local offices of the FBI in their state of residence. 22 The quote is from Degler (1991, viii) cited in Hodgson (2005, 119) . On the reshaping of the American identity in relation to contemporary scientific conceptions, see Stanley Coben (1975) , Richard Weiss (1979) and Philip Gleason (1981 
